Third and final hearing into loss of SS El Faro scheduled Feb. 6, 2017

Memorial photographs of fallen #elfaro crew on display at today’s hearing.

Please pardon my ignorance but what is “Wastage on the vent trunks”. Rust damage?

This is “Rust damage”:

This is “wastage”:

Not on a vent trunk, but similar.

Here is a drawing of the cargo hold vents.

This is a photo taken from inside the holds,on the second deck the inspection plates have been removed.

Not sure what the path of the sea water would be, presumably the drain holes shown on the drawing are to return water to the sea that has entered the louvers and keep it out of the vent trunks.

Thanks for the schematic.

      • Updated - - -

[QUOTE=ombugge;195072]This is “Rust damage”:

This is “wastage”:

Not on a vent trunk, but similar.[/QUOTE]

Thanks for the clear illustration. Never seen this on a working vessel.

[QUOTE=ombugge;195072]This is “Rust damage”:

This is “wastage”:

Not on a vent trunk, but similar.[/QUOTE]

I should have specified extreme rust damage. I’m no engineer but I see no reason for an ambient air vent trunk to be bricked. You’re stretching it as usual but that’s just who you are so thanks for the response.

This is from the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Center’s report on the El Faro stability - The report is here

Page 11 shows the righting arm, GZ (righting arm) is max at about 22 degree heel, GZ goes to zero at about 38 degrees heel.

 Plausible sequence
 Hold 3 floods, wind heel ( 15 degrees)
 Hold 2A floods through through vent openings openings ( Holds 2, 1)
 Loss of stability, partial capsize, port main deck awash
 Loss of containers on deck (arresting full capsize)
 Continued flooding through port vent openings
 Vessel sinks
 Returns ~upright (f d ixe b ll ) a

El Yunque- the emergency fire pump and inlet piping in the number three hold

El Faro’s Captain kept close eye on crew rest

By Stephanie Brown

Former El Faro crew members continue to help investigators piece together what may have been happening on board ahead of the ship’s sinking.

For the second time, former El Faro Third Mate Alejandro Berrios testified in front of the Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation to give insight on some of the conversations captured by the ship’s Voyage Data Recorder and other data that was recovered from the device.

With a VDR conversation showing two crew members talking about a time an officer had fallen asleep while on watch, witnesses during this MBI have been questioned about crew fatigue. Berrios says fatigue wasn’t an issue and- especially working under El Faro Captain Michael Davidson- rest was closely monitored. He says Davidson would not just closely follow whether crew got enough rest per regulation, but he would offer to pick up extra watches even if an officer was feeling tired.

“You have to be careful from [El Faro Master] Mike Davidson. He will ask you personally if you were well rested and he will remind you that he’s available to take over the watch,” Berrios says.

A prior witness testified that work and rest hours have now been moved to a software system, instead of being tracked through a form. Berrios explained to investigators how the tracking is done, including explaining specific inputs from El Faro.

He wasn’t aware at the time of the sinking of a certain federal regulation dealing with how much on-duty time an officer has to have before working a watch shift, while the ship is leaving port. Questions from investigators immediately following an explanation of that regulation talked specifically about watch and rest hours ahead of El Faro leaving, but didn’t give enough detail at this point to see how the regulation applied to the ship in that time frame.

Berrios also wasn’t familiar with any specific definition for “rest” as required under work guidelines. He says he interpreted it as “not working”- whether that was listening to music, relaxing in his cabin, or other leisure activies.

Relating to other ship operations, Berrios says he saw drills performed often, and the lifeboat components were checked weekly. The hydrostatic releases for two of the ship’s life rafts were going to expire in September 2015, according to a record cited by the MBI Board. An email from the ship’s Chief Mate on the morning of September 29, 2015 showed they were waiting for at least one to come through.

“Just following up. As far as I know, we have not received the hydrostatic release, still need it.” said the email, per a reading during the MBI.

Berrios believes there was likely a paperwork issue not reflecting that there were new life rafts, not that the hydrostatics were going to expire while on what would become the final voyage. According to the NTSB, El Faro had two extra life rafts on board in addition to the three required, and none were found in their stowed location in the wreckage.

If there was an error with the paperwork, it wasn’t one that was common, according to his assessment of the crew. Berrios described his counterparts as meticulous and detailed. He got emotional when being questioned about whether he believed the ship had “a good crew”.

He told investigators he had been trained on whistleblowing procedures, although he wasn’t completely familiar with how to report from at sea, because any phone call would likely not be from an isolated location.

Berrios touched on a range of other topics- from changing out of autopilot steering to working the weather systems and his responsibility as a Port Mate, when he previously held that position.

Uncertainty lingers around whether device on El Faro’s life rafts was expired

Feb 10, 2017 - 10:46 PM
by: Lorena Inclan, Action News Jax Updated:

JACKSONVILLE, Fla. - As the hearings into the October 2015 sinking of cargo ship El Faro enter day five in the third round of hearings, we are learning the vessel’s chief mate had requested a device for its lift rafts.

During the questioning of El Faro’s former second mate, Alejandro Berrios, Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation member Keith Fawcett brought up an email from one of the lost crew members.

The email was sent by Chief Mate Steven Schultz to Port Engineer Tim Neeson on Sept. 29, 2015, at 9:52 a.m., two days before the sinking.

“’Hello Tim, just following up. As far as I know we have not received the hydrostatic release still needed. Best regards, Steve Schultz Chief Mate,’” Fawcett read aloud. “Do you know if there was a hydrostatic release the ship was looking for?”

“I didn’t know,” said Berrios.

A hydrostatic release is a device that releases the life raft. According to Fawcett, the safety inspection sheet shows the releases were going to expire in September.

“Would that in fact mean that the hydrostatic release would have been expired?” asked Fawcett.

“To the best of my knowledge, when we get new life rafts on board, we replace the hydrostatic release. So the only thing that this tells me is that maybe the sheet wasn’t updated,” said Berrios.

Berrios said that when he sailed on El Faro as the second mate, he saw the new life rafts in place under a “cradle.”

“We always had practiced changing the hydrostatic release on the raft as you replace the raft,” said Berrios.

The board also questioned Berrios about proper rest hours and regulations surrounding the amount of rest mariners need to get.

Despite previous concerns about crew fatigue, Berrios said that Capt. Michael Davidson, who was aboard the final voyage, was strict when it came to making sure his crew got rest.

Berrios said Davidson would often offer to take over a watch if a crew member felt tired.

The board also wanted to know the procedures for sending a distress message from the ship and whether the equipment is tested.

Berrios said they often send test messages.

Board member Cmdr. Matt Denning said the Coast Guard received a distress alert from El Faro but not a distress message. In a distress message, the user is able to type in more information.

Denning asked Berrios if there were any concerns with the equipment.

“To the best of my knowledge, perhaps one didn’t go across the satellite to the land station. I wouldn’t think that the equipment wasn’t working,” said Berrios.

Lou O’Donnell, the assistant chief surveyor for the American Bureau of Shipping, took the stand after Berrios.

O’Donnell, who has testified at a previous Marine Board of Investigation hearing, returned for more extensive questioning.

O’Donnell oversees the work of a team of vessel surveyors who are tasked with ensuring ships are in compliance. Under the Alternate Compliance Program, which El Faro was enrolled in, ABS surveyors perform surveys on behalf of the Coast Guard.

ABS has received some criticism from a previous witness about reluctance on the part of surveyors.

“I have a hard time believing our surveyors are reluctant to issue a condition of class,” said O’Donnell. “I see it in my work day to day where we do that, we would issue a condition of class on something that’s not rectified.”

The communication between ABS and the Coast Guard has also been criticized but O’Donnell said he’s seen that improve over time.

“Since my tenure in the last almost three years, a very good relationship with the local Coast Guard. They’re on a first-name basis in a lot of areas,” said O’Donnell.

The hearing will reconvene on Monday at 9 a.m. with testimony from TOTE executives.

© 2017 Cox Media Group.

El Faro families honor lost loved ones during Coast Guard hearing

Family members of those who died on the El Faro cargo ship often sit in the front row of investigative hearings into the ship sinking, a tragedy that shook the maritime industry and claimed the lives of all 33 crew members on board.

On Friday, those left behind lined the front row with large photos of their loved ones — their sons, fathers, siblings and spouses. Those photos sat a few feet behind those testifying and faced federal investigators conducting the hearing as a vivid reminder of the human face of the case.

Glen Jackson, who lost his brother Jack, said they wanted to “put a face to this otherwise faceless tragedy.”

Jackson has attended every minute of the five weeks of hearings by the U.S. Coast Guard, which continues at 9 a.m. Monday for the final week. He drives in from New Orleans and stays in a nearby hotel.

“It’s a combination of horror and relief,” Jackson said of the hearing process. He appreciates that the Coast Guard decided to move forward with an investigative hearing instead of brushing the tragedy aside, but it can be a trying process. He does not expect any criminal charges from the proceedings, which is difficult. The Coast Guard cannot prosecute, but can work in coordination with the Department of Justice.

In the beginning, Jackson said he was searching for a villain — someone to blame for killing his brother.

The 790-foot ship lost propulsion on Oct. 1, 2015, during Hurricane Joaquin leaving the ship and its crew at the mercy of the powerful storm.

Rochelle Hamm wants people to remember her husband, Frank Hamm of Jacksonville — “an awesome man” who was her best friend and soul mate. She said he is sorely missed by her, her children and grandchildren.

“We want everyone to know we’re not giving up,” Hamm said. She is one of the family members who along with Jackson and his sister have sat through hour after hour of testimony in the case. “I talk about it every day.”

Hamm is pushing for increased oversight of the industry, including forcing ships to avoid storms when underway, ensuring better lifeboats are on commercial vessels and reviewing standards for aging vessels particularly as they are modified. Ship builders, at one point in the El Faro’s 40-year existence, modified the ship to lengthen it.

While people talk about life gradually getting easier after tragedies, Hamm disagrees: “It gets harder.”

Hamm said having the hearing in February, when it would have been her husband’s birthday, their 20th wedding anniversary and Valentine’s Day when they always traveled together, makes coping even more difficult. February was an important month for the Hamms.

“It’s very difficult for me the month of February,” Hamm said. “It is very difficult for us.”

The family members also wore matching shirts listing the names of the crew on Friday in memory of the El Faro 33.

Jackson brings a photo of his brother every day, but about a dozen other families brought them Friday.

Jackson said one of his concerns with the hearings so far could be addressed next week when former employees who are no longer connected to ship owner and operator Tote Services Inc. testify. Most of the current and former crew members for El Faro and sister ship El Yunque either continue to work for Tote or are represented by Tote attorneys, who sit next to them while they are testifying. He is hoping for a different perspective from those former employees.

‘Catastrophic failure’

In Friday testimony, a top surveyor with the firm that inspected the El Faro said cold water flooding into the engine room hitting the hot boiler could have caused “catastrophic failure” and lead to an explosion.

Lou O’Donnell, assistant chief surveyor for the Americas with the American Bureau of Shipping, said he was invited by the National Transportation Safety Board to listen to key portions of the audio retrieved from the ship’s voyage data recorder of the ship’s last hours. When asked whether the engine room would have been the last space under the deck to flood, O’Donnell said it is difficult to say without knowing the chain of events.

O’Donnell said he knows from the audio recorded on board that those on the navigation bridge were in contact with the engine room until very late in the incident.

“Sounds like the engineers were doing a lot down there to get the vessel going again,” O’Donnell said.

Some family members looked at each other when O’Donnell, when asked, talked briefly about listening to the audio. The NTSB is not allowed, by federal law, to let the family listen to the audio. Some have pushed to listen to the audio and said regardless of whether they take the opportunity, they should have the right to listen to their loved ones one last time.

Hamm believes family members should be able to listen, although she readily acknowledges it would be difficult.

“It would be tough because it is tough for me to read” the transcript, she said. The NTSB released the more-than-500-page transcript, which depicted harrowing moments in the final hours on board and has helped fill in some gaps for families and investigators.

The Coast Guard has delegated authority to the ABS and other class societies to inspect commercial vessels to ensure they meet safety codes and to avoid duplication of some inspection work. Some investigators have asked tough questions about the program and oversight by the ABS and the Coast Guard.

Required rest

Coast Guard Marine Board of Investigation member Keith Fawcett had former El Faro officer Alejandro Berrios review logs to show some officers on duty were not receiving the required amount of rest. Berrios acknowledged that during the rest time, crew members are not required to sleep.

“I am aware of it now. I was not aware of it back then,” Berrios said when asked about federal requirements for rest before going on watch.

Berrios, who worked as both a second mate and third mate on the ship, talked about sailing with El Faro captain Michael Davidson.

On the transcribed audio of the final hours of the El Faro, two officers called Davidson overnight while he was in his cabin to update him about their concerns about approaching Hurricane Joaquin. Davidson was asleep at least one of those times when the mates called.

Berrios served on the night watch when Davidson was captain and would call the captain at night if needed.

“He would pick up the phone right away and sound alive, positive and happy that you make that phone call,” he said. The captain would tell him “I’ll be right up.”

“At all times he was available and would come up to the bridge,” Berrios said.

Davidson, despite the nearing hurricane and two calls from officers, did not appear to return to the navigation bridge during several critical hours. He was at the helm in the final three hours.

Davidson promoted safety on the El Faro, took drills seriously and conducted surprise drills, had crew members wear suits, and had open communication with deck officers, engine officers, and other crew members, Berrios confirmed when asked by the attorney for Davidson’s widow.

Davidson would often make himself available to take over a watch shift to ensure other officers had sufficient rest, Berrios said.

The two-week hearing continues from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. weekdays through Friday at the Prime Osborn Convention Center, 1000 Water St.

The public can attend the hearing, which can also be viewed on a live stream at: livestream.com/USCGInvestigations.

Hearing schedule here;

This probably rates a new thread. http://maritime-executive.com/article/el-faro-could-have-suffered-boiler-explosion

The ABS twit that suggested that must have gone to the same school as the silly cow who thought hydro testing the economizer below operating pressure was all that was required (or was afraid to test properly).

Is ABS doing its training by having surveyors watch old movies or something?

The VDR transcripts leads me to believe she rolled over and went down shortly after. This boiler explosion shit makes as much sense as open lifeboats. The black gang was communicating with the bridge right up to the end. Nothing in transcripts suggests anything other than lube oil pump issues. This theory is obfuscation to take light off the fact that this ship had been getting rubber stamped inspections for some time. Couple that with the fact the ABS/USCG has a limited knowledge base of anything doing with steam propulsion and this is what you get. Every year that goes by the people with operational and design experience of these systems is retiring. I haven’t been on a steam ship in 20 years. I bet I have a better idea of how it all works than the nimrods they pump out of the bastard factory who show up to “inspect” it.

why, why, WHY are we and the hearings focusing on the ship and not on the man who took that ship into obvious peril? We know the ship flooded and propulsion failed at a critical moment but it was the decision by the master to continue on a course which took the vessel into danger which is why there was the loss of the ship and her people. WHY did Davidson not slow down and heave to when he still had the chance to do so? I CONTINUE TO SAY HE WAS INTIMIDATED BY TOTE MANAGEMENT TO NOT BE LATE GETTING TO PR INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING OFFERED COMMAND OF ONE OF THE NEW SHIPS IF HE COMPLIED!

who here agrees with me that this is where the investigation needs to go!

I agree about the lack of expertise shown in general by the level of questions being asked at the hearings. It’s a lack of respect that people with so little knowledge of commercial ship operations would waste so much time and attention at the hearing.

However in the case of the statements made about the possibility of a boiler explosion; it was just said that they may have exploded when the engine room flooded when the ship sank, it was not being claimed that an explosion caused the loss of propulsion.

Obviously the ship had issues, but why do they seem focused on rest and hydrostatic releases? I admit I haven’t read all transcripts, but I read those. You can take a well rested crew with a brand new ship with all he latest safety equipment and still have the same result when losing propulsion in that hurricane

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;195096]However in the case of the statements made about the possibility of a boiler explosion; it was just said that they may have exploded when the engine room flooded when the ship sank, it was not being claimed that an explosion caused the loss of propulsion.[/QUOTE]

No one said it caused the loss … read the posts.

Saying that a boiler may have exploded is more evidence to clearly indicate the ABS guy is very deeply over his head as was his counterpart who did the economizer hydro tests.

Suggesting that a boiler explosion would cause the house to separate from the hull is absurd. Considering the boat was heeled far over in the trough, and the house was minimally attached (there were two traffic lanes passing through it) it should be no surprise that a large boarding wave might rip it off.

I would love to hear that ABS guy describe the physics and mechanics of the boiler “exploding” just because it got wet. I think he has watched too many old movies and knows nothing about steam or boilers.

I agree that this entire hearing has gone far astray … first the dipshit NTSB guy publicly states his own fantasies about why the disaster happened, then the ABS sends its B team to testify. In the meantime no one has focused on the company culture that is the real cause of the deaths of 33 seafarers. The CG and NTSB are doing everything they can to avoid talking about fatigue and pressure to keep a schedule no matter what.

Now the ignorant press is flooded with “boiler explosion” mythology rather than asking questions about the elephant in that hearing room. A pox on all their houses …

[QUOTE=c.captain;195095]why, why, WHY are we and the hearings focusing on the ship and not on the man who took that ship into obvious peril? We know the ship flooded and propulsion failed at a critical moment but it was the decision by the master to continue on a course which took the vessel into danger which is why there was the loss of the ship and her people. WHY did Davidson not slow down and heave to when he still had the chance to do so? I CONTINUE TO SAY HE WAS INTIMIDATED BY TOTE MANAGEMENT TO NOT BE LATE GETTING TO PR INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING OFFERED COMMAND OF ONE OF THE NEW SHIPS IF HE COMPLIED!

who here agrees with me that this is where the investigation needs to go![/QUOTE]

I was criticized for bringing this up earlier. If we agree that the master’s actions or lack thereof played the critical role, the motive for his atypical behavior need to be closely examined.
While it’s not pleasant to second guess the motives of a man who is not here to defend himself, it’s too important to ignore. Why did he downplay the seriousness of their situation and ignore his crew’s concerns? Was it to show them and TOTE he could deliver no matter what? Was it complacency, bravado, or a reaction to rejection? Is it possible he had already been told he was being let go in mid career and became somewhat unhinged?
Although he took the con in the last hours, his decision to take a nap until past the point of no return doesn’t demonstrate the actions of someone committed to staying on top of a critical situation. He seemed to systematically minimize the severity of their predicament until it was too late.

New hydrostatic releases for life rafts have nothing to do with the incident. Loss of propulsion and water ingress are important links in the chain of causation, but not the root cause.

Indeed, why was the ship there in the first place? Davidson knew better as indicated by his previous diversion into safe weather on a prior voyage. It appears that Davidson was in the doghouse at TOTE for making that previous diversion. The key question is: Did TOTE pressure Davidson not to take a safe route to avoid the storm? I think must of us have an opinion on what the answer is. The next question is: Is there any way to prove it?

[QUOTE=c.captain;195095]why, why, WHY are we and the hearings focusing on the ship and not on the man who took that ship into obvious peril? We know the ship flooded and [B]propulsion failed[/B] at a critical moment but it was the decision by the master to continue on a course which took the vessel into danger which is why there was the loss of the ship and her people. WHY did Davidson not slow down and heave to when he still had the chance to do so? I CONTINUE TO SAY HE WAS INTIMIDATED BY TOTE MANAGEMENT TO NOT BE LATE GETTING TO PR INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF BEING OFFERED COMMAND OF ONE OF THE NEW SHIPS IF HE COMPLIED!

who here agrees with me that this is where the investigation needs to go![/QUOTE]

Yes there was a loss of propulsion but I would not characterize it as a propulsion failure. The list resulted in a safety device triggering a propulsion shutdown. Unfortunately there is a lot of detritus being thrown about which has little or nothing to do with the causes of the El Faro’s sinking.

[QUOTE=tugsailor;195104]
Indeed, why was the ship there in the first place? Davidson knew better as indicated by his previous diversion into safe weather on a prior voyage. It appears that Davidson was in the doghouse at TOTE for making that previous diversion. The key question is: Did TOTE pressure Davidson not to take a safe route to avoid the storm? I think must of us have an opinion on what the answer is. The next question is: Is there any way to prove it?[/QUOTE]

Either Davidson was unhinged, or he made a rational decision based on incorrect information. There a lot of parallels between the El Faro and the Fantome, lost with 31 souls during Hurricane Mitch. Both were aging vessels with maintenance issues, but the primary cause of each loss was that they ended up in major hurricanes. In both cases, the National Hurricane Center forecasts were wrong and the hurricanes went south.

Where the stories diverge is in the communications between the ship and the company. In the case of the Fantome, the young captain was in contact with the Windjammer Cruises, and followed their directions for storm avoidance. Unfortunately, the company directions took the ship from a safe location that was in the forecast storm track to its demise in the center of the actual storm.

On the El Faro, they were getting conflicting information on the storm, and some of it was too old to be useful. If I was the captain, I would have been on the phone with the company and the best weather router available–a real expert, with access to real time information.

The outcome of the Fantome tragedy was that Windjammer Cruises was sued into bankruptcy. In the case of Tote, because Davidson did not call them for advice/help, they will be able to blame the disaster on him and escape judgments.

To avoid future tragedies, you need to change the system and the law which makes captains responsible, but denies them the assistance which modern communications technology has made available.

I have a question that has been nagging me: with regard to the pressure or lack of it placed on the captain to arrive on schedule, has anyone examined the cargo manifest and figured out what there was on board that would account for the perceived need to save a day or two? I ask this because of our experience in examining the similar pressure that was placed on the Deepwater Horizon crew. As in this case, there was all kinds of speculation about the cause, but when we put together the accounting documents and internal correspondence it turned out to something that the speculation missed entirely. Just what was it that had to get there on that given day?

Earl