“The Clock Is Ticking”: Inside the Worst U.S. Maritime Disaster in Decades


#162

If the crew had held together Captain Queeg would have gotten through.

Keith: But no matter what, Captain Queeg endangered the ship and the lives of the men.
Greenwald: He didn’t endanger anybody’s life! You did! All of you! You’re a fine bunch of officers.

Greenwald: Tell me, Steve, after the Yellowstain business, Queeg came to you guys for help and you turned him down, didn’t you?
Maryk: Yes, we did.
Greenwald: You didn’t approve of his conduct as an officer. He wasn’t worthy of your loyalty. So you turned on him. You ragged him. You made up songs about him. If you’d given Queeg the loyalty he needed, do you suppose the whole issue would have come up in the typhoon?


#163

I never realized that phenomenon had a name.


#164

To return to the internet and to find this discussion still ongoing is distressing. To base the quantity of lube oil in the sump on the amount entered in the stability programme is nonsense. One ton, two tons the effect on the ships stability is bloody close to zero and I can not apportion blame on the Engineering Staff.
The voyage data recorder tells me that an autocratic action by the master got an old ship into a predicament where a number incidents led to a tragic result.
I did get cross eyed looking at stability data in feet and inches, the last time I did so I was a lot younger with maybe more neurones. Thank god for the metric system.


#165

May I complete that; “Except in Government, where there are no upper limit”


#166

Do Matson still have NCB check the lashings before sailing? Never hurts to have an extra pair of eyes.


#167

3 posts were split to a new topic: El Faro Stablity


#170

After reading Slade’s book I’m more inclined to agree with this.