So NOW will there be changes in how drilling operations in the GoM are conducted?


#1

to me, the DWH was not the bellweather moment which brought any real fundamental changes to the way drilling takes place in the GoM but with the massive amount of liability laid at the feet of BP this week cause a new paradigm in drilling? Even though Transocean was absolved of its own liability by the court, will the operators take a new look at the practices aboard rigs. I still feel that the men in the driller’s cabin that evening in April 2010 had the chance close the well before the blowout occurred but fatally hesitated with catastrophic results. BP’s practices of putting profits before safety is what lead to the accident but could TO have prevented it? Certainly, they have to have seen the blowout coming for sometime before it erupted uncontrolled with so much gas that a cataclysmic explosion was inevitable?

[B]BP Found Grossly Negligent In 2010 Gulf Oil Spill[/B]

By Bloomberg On September 4, 2014

Sept. 4 (Bloomberg) — BP Plc acted with gross negligence in setting off the biggest offshore oil spill in U.S. history, a federal judge ruled, handing down a long-awaited decision that may force the energy company to pay billions of dollars more for the 2010 Gulf of Mexico disaster.

U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier held a trial without a jury over who was at fault for the environmental catastrophe, which killed 11 people and spewed oil for almost three months into waters that touch the shores of five states. The case also included Transocean Ltd. and Halliburton Co., though the judge didn’t find them as responsible for the spill as BP. (Update: Halliburton Co. and Transocean Ltd. were cleared of gross negligence for their roles in oil spill, allowing the companies to avoid the harshest penalties.)

“BP’s conduct was reckless,” Barbier wrote in a decision today in New Orleans federal court. “Transocean’s conduct was negligent. Halliburton’s conduct was negligent.”

Barbier apportioned fault at 67 percent for BP, 30 percent for Transocean and 3 percent for Halliburton. BP shares fell as much as 5.3 percent on the news.

The ruling marks a turning point in the legal morass surrounding the causes and impact of the disaster. Four years of debate and legal testimony have centered on who was at fault and how much blame each company should carry.

BP Appeal

BP is “subject to enhanced penalties under the Clean Water Act,” because the discharge of oil was the result of its exploration unit’s gross negligence and willful misconduct, Barbier said. BP said it “strongly disagrees” with the decision and will challenge it before the U.S. Court of Appeals in New Orleans.

“BP believes that the finding that it was grossly negligent with respect to the accident and that its activities at the Macondo well amounted to willful misconduct is not supported by the evidence at trial,” the company said in an e- mailed statement. “ The law is clear that proving gross negligence is a very high bar that was not met in this case.”

The coalition of plaintiffs included the federal government, five Gulf of Mexico states, banks, restaurants, fishermen and a host of others who have pursued redress for their losses. While today’s ruling provides a partial answer, appeals may mean it will be years before final penalties are settled.

BP, which may face fines of as much as $18 billion, has set aside $3.5 billion to cover those penalties. The company had taken a $43 billion charge to cover all the costs related to the spill, according to a July 29 earnings statement. The ultimate cost is “subject to significant uncertainty,” BP said.

Barbier has yet to rule on how much oil was spilled, a key factor in determining the extent of BP’s fines.

The decision nevertheless may expose BP to unspecified punitive damages for claimants who weren’t part of the $9.2 billion settlement the company reached with most non-government plaintiffs in 2012. The judge left that unclear in his ruling.

“Although BP’s conduct warrants the imposition of punitive damages under general maritime law, BP cannot be held liable for such damages under Fifth Circuit precedent,” he wrote, referring to the federal appellate jurisdiction that includes Louisiana.

In a footnote, however, Barbier said BP might be liable for punitive damages for other claims.

With only a ruling of negligence, Transocean escapes any such liability. Halliburton, which also won an earlier indemnity ruling, removed the threat of punitive damages by agreeing to a $1.1 billion settlement with most plaintiffs Sept. 2.

Rig Blowout

The blowout and explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig on April 20, 2010, caused the deaths of 11 workers and spilled millions of barrels of crude oil into the Gulf, harming wildlife and fouling hundreds of miles of beaches and coastal wetlands.

Equipment failures and questions about lapses in oversight led to an overhaul of federal regulations governing offshore safety in the following years. The agencies overseeing deep- water drilling were reorganized, with new rules put in place to strengthen requirements for equipment, inspections and accident response.

The disaster sparked thousands of lawsuits against BP; Vernier, Switzerland-based Transocean, the owner of the drilling rig; and Houston-based Halliburton, which provided cement for the well.

Litigation Begins

The spill’s fallout entered the courts on two tracks — criminal and civil. In 2012, BP pleaded guilty to 14 federal counts, including manslaughter for the 11 deaths in the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig, and obstructing Congress as it probed the size of the spill.

The U.K.-based energy company also agreed to pay $4 billion to end the criminal case. Transocean last year pleaded guilty to a U.S. charge tied to the Clean Water Act, and agreed to pay $1.4 billion. A Halliburton unit last year pleaded guilty to one count of destroying evidence for failing to preserve computer models examining its cement job on the well after the explosion. Halliburton paid a $200,000 fine. BP also agreed to pay $525 million to settle U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission claims that it misrepresented the size of the spill, misleading shareholders as to its potential liability.

Main Case

But the primary litigation remaining, now more than four years after the spill, is the pending lawsuits by the U.S. government, five gulf states and thousands of individuals and businesses claiming economic and environmental losses. While Halliburton wasn’t sued by the U.S., the states and other plaintiffs included the company in their claims.

BP settled the claims brought by most non-government plaintiffs, such as business owners and Gulf residents hurt by the spill, in March 2012, just before trial was to begin. The deal postponed the start of its first phase to February 2013.

That phase, which lasted two months, addressed who was at fault and whether gross negligence played a role in the 2010 explosion. The term is defined as intentionally failing to perform a clear duty, in reckless disregard of the consequences to lives and property.

The second phase, completed in October, focused on the size of the spill, and efforts to contain it. A third phase is set for January to determine how much some of the defendants should pay in pollution fines.

One Man

Since shortly after the spill, the resolution of the disaster has largely been in the hands of one man, Barbier, who has spent much of his life on the Gulf coast.

Barbier, 70, was appointed to the federal court in New Orleans in 1998 by President Bill Clinton, a Democrat. A former maritime lawyer who began his career representing sailors in personal-injury cases, the judge has been overseeing BP spill litigation since August 2010.

Barbier grew up in the West Bank, a cluster of suburbs, small cities and unincorporated towns straddling the border of the Orleans and Jefferson parishes, across the Mississippi River from the city of New Orleans. He went to high school in Harvey, a residential neighborhood of single-family homes that sprung up around the oilfield services industry and the Harvey Industrial Canal. He went on to win a football scholarship to Southeastern Louisiana University, where he played on the offensive and defensive lines.

After earning a business degree in 1966, Barbier worked as a high school teacher and accountant, including stints at Boeing Co. and Shell Oil Co., while attending law school, according to testimony at his confirmation hearings in 1998.

Blowout Causes

Lawyers for the U.S. government and oil-spill victims told Barbier during the first phase that BP was over-budget and behind schedule, prompting it to cut corners and ignore safety tests showing the Macondo well was unstable. BP was $60 million in the red and 54 days late on the well by April 9, 2010, just 11 days before the blowout, the plaintiffs’ lawyers said in court papers last year.

The plaintiffs also alleged that Houston-based Halliburton’s cement job was defective, and that Transocean employees made a series of missteps on the rig, including failing to properly maintain it, disabling safety systems and not providing adequate training for its crew.

Blame

The companies, meanwhile, blamed each other. BP said at trial that Transocean failed to maintain the drilling rig and Halliburton provided defective cementing services. Transocean and Halliburton pointed their fingers back at BP. BP denied it was grossly negligent while accepting blame for errors that caused the spill.

The Deepwater Horizon “blowout resulted from a series of independent acts and omissions by independent individuals that, when combined, had the effect of overcoming state-of-the-art safety systems,” BP told the judge last year.

In the second phase of the trial, the U.S. contended BP’s well spewed 4.2 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico before it was capped almost three months later. BP estimated the flow at 2.45 million barrels. Both agreed their numbers would have been higher if 810,000 barrels hadn’t been captured by a siphoning device placed at the wellhead.

Second Phase

Lawyers for Transocean, Halliburton and plaintiffs claimed in the second phase that BP delayed the capping of the well by misrepresenting the size of the spill, as well as prospects for containing it. The spill victims also alleged that BP wasn’t prepared for a deep-water blowout.

BP initially valued its economic-loss settlement at $7.8 billion. It now puts the cost at $9.2 billion, with the final price “likely to be significantly higher,” according to the July 29 regulatory filing.

Halliburton reached a separate $1.1 billion settlement with most spill plaintiffs earlier this week. The company has taken a $1.3 billion reserve for costs related to the spill.

BP has reserved $3.5 billion for civil penalties under the Clean Water Act, using its own estimates on oil spilled and based on its “conclusion, among other things, that it did not act with gross negligence or engage in willful misconduct,” the company said in its 2013 annual report.

BP hasn’t increased the reserve, the company said in its most recent quarterly filing.

‘Timing’

“The amount and timing of the amount to be paid ultimately is subject to significant uncertainty since it will depend on what is determined” by the court on multiple issues, including gross negligence and the amount of oil spilled, BP said in the filing.

The amount will also depend on how Barbier applies penalty factors set in the Clean Water Act, BP said.

The company had set aside $43 billion to cover all the costs of the spill, and so far has paid out more than $28 billion for response, cleanup and claims.

Once he decides on the size of the spill, Barbier will consider eight criteria in setting the fine, including the seriousness of the violation, the degree of culpability, any history of prior violations, any other penalties for the same incident, and what BP has done to minimize or mitigate the effects of the spill.

Under the law, Barbier also has to consider the possible economic impact of any penalty on the company.

Accord

BP’s accord resolved economic-loss claims for fishing boat owners and multiple classes of businesses and property owners in Louisiana, Alabama and Mississippi and in parts of Texas and Florida.

It excluded claims of financial institutions, casinos, some private plaintiffs in Florida and Texas, and residents and businesses claiming harm from the Obama Administration’s resulting moratorium on deep-water drilling. It also didn’t cover claims by governments.

Barbier gave final approval to the settlement in December 2012. An appeal by objectors to the settlement was rejected by the U.S. appeals court in New Orleans.

BP lost a separate appeal on its claim that the administrator of the settlement was paying for unjustified claims. The company asked the U.S. Supreme Court on Aug. 1 to review the decisions.

The case is In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, MDL-2179, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans).

will there ever be a structure for mandatory training for drillers and established levels of experience in grade before promotions from floor to chair? As any of us who have worked in deepwater drilling know, a massive degree of responsibility rests on the man at the button to make instantaneous decision to close the shear rams when a blowout is about to occur damned the costs. Does anyone else here believe that no matter whatever the prhaessure from a company man, the safety of any well rests with a toolpusher on tour and the man he has in charge on the floor?power to

I have always held that it is the operators and not the drillers who control change since they have the greatest degree of liability as we see so clearly here and with the power to impose their own demands upon the companies they hire to make the hole. If I was a operator in the deepwater and see now how the courts are going to make me bleed heavily for any accident, I would make it absolute that the people given the critical responsibilities were without question in their abilities to make the right decisions without hesitation. The men who were at the switch that evening died and were never able to tell the tale of that they say coming and what they did to prevent the catastrophe that did occur. Should there be automation written into the drilling software to remove the human element so that when downhole pressures go so wildly out of balance, a well will close itself?


#2

Anadarko also got caught with some emails that said drill baby drill


#3

Sorry to revive an old thread again, but this may change the way how drilling operations in the GoM are conducted:


Back to the good old cowboy days, Yeehaw!!!


#4

remind me how many US gov departments can come on a rig to inspect?


#5

I expect BP was surprised by that ruling. I would imagine the main reason they hire drilling companies instead of being their own drilling company is to offset the liability of an accident (“they were drilling, not us”). They pushed their involvement too far with company men on the rigs and BP making decisions from shore.


#6

Since OPA 90, enacted following Exxon Valdez, just about everybody in anyway involved with an oil spill is jointly and severally liable. Obviously, the government and the plaintiff’s lawyers focus on the defendants with the deepest pockets. No one has deeper pockets than an oil super major.

Clever schemes with layers of contractors, subcontractors and layers of shell corporations and minority owners no longer insulate anyone from liability for an oil spill.

From a liability point of view, it makes better sense for an oil major to vertically integrate and eliminate as many contractors as possible, and run a good tight operation.

It would make sense for oil majors to buy modern new high spec drillships at dirt cheap prices at the bottom of the slump. Same with OSV’s, etc.