Of course we all knew this...it was the Navee's fault...TWICE!


Fitzgerald was in a hard left turn with all engines ordered, but not yet at, flank speed.

This was ordered 30 seconds or so prior to impact, and her course was changing and speed increasing at time of impact.

It’s in the 177-page long comprehensive review.


Sure, the maritime academies should send the training ships to sea on cruise with 20 crew and no cadets, be cheaper and more efficient.


I don’t understand how the Fitzgerald “screams of crew fatigue” yet in the case of the McCain the fatigue can be easily managed. If that’s the case why wasn’t fatigue on the Fitzgerald managed better?


Hush…can’t you see they’re short handed. There’s no one standing watch at the speaking tube.


Regarding Fitz - Failure to call the Captain.

Back in September of 1970, I reported aboard the USS Everett F. Larson (DD-830) in San Diego as a radarman. On its previous WESTPAC, LARSON was instrumental in keeping the stern of USS FRANK E. EVANS afloat after EVANS was cut in two by Australian carrier Melbourne. The vivid recollections of the LARSON’s crew reporting the carnage had a lasting impression.

My point? In the collision of EVANS & MELBOURNE, the OOD & JOOD FAILED to call the Captain as stated in his night orders when the formation changed course.

And we read about the Fitz’s close encounters without notifying command. Y’know. There were a few times that, as a radarman 2nd class, I called the captain from CIC when the bridge team was acting stupid. Sometimes, one just has to recognize that safety of the ship know no rank.

It saddens me that human nature still prohibits us from following directives meant to keep the ship safe. I don’t care what the command culture is: Call the old man!! (and then request a transfer if it’s “that bad”.


Just screams noise to me: A talkin to B talking to C talking to D talking to C talking B talking A and WTF is F talking about!


I just wonder how a Pilot react when he comes on board to take a US Navy ship into port and try to get his orders executed efficiently.

Do the CO let the Pilot take the “conn”, or does he become the “F” in the above? (Maybe especially in foreign port??)


Compare this with an aircraft’s ‘sterile cockpit’ for take off and landing or extremis!


Good point BTW!


what I want to know is who is who up there? the guy with arms crossed looks like the craftmaster but is he OOD or is someone else OOD then who is JOOD and who is CONN? what a miserable CLUSTERFUCK looking for an accident!


I don’t understand how the Fitzgerald “screams of crew fatigue” yet in the case of the McCain the fatigue can be easily managed. If that’s the case why wasn’t fatigue on the Fitzgerald managed better?

You’re right, both ships had fatigue issues.

The McCain was executing a known difficult transit, and had briefed that they were planning on entering the traffic separation scheme at 0500, then entering port in Singapore. They could have(should have) managed their entire day around this, to include sleep schedules the night before.

The Fitz fucked this up as well, but worse. They got underway early in the morning the previous day, trained and did scenarios all day, then had stuff going at night. The comprehensive report states that the 2200-0200 watch had not been allowed to sleep prior to taking the watch, despite having been awake since early the previous day.

The McCain team had at least had some rest since the incident took place later, and they were coming off a normal underway schedule instead of transitioning from in-port to at-sea.


I haven’t gotten all the way through the 177 pages, but page 36 was an eye opener. The OOD of the Fitz was a woman. With the benefit of hindsight, she was obviously not qualified to run the ship without supervision. I’m not saying that there all women are not qualified for command, I’m just wondering if her sex made the qualification and selection process treat her differently.


How old are you oldsailor? That’s what you’re wondering?


I’m not as old as the guy who wrote this wiki

“Women were said to bring bad luck on board because they distracted the sailors from their sea duties. This kind of behaviour angered the intemperate seas that would take their revenge out on the ship.”

However, I note that the CO got the axe, because that’s tradition, the XO got the axe because the admirals were really pissed off, and the senior enlisted may go the axe because he went to the can at the wrong time. However, why the clueless OOD skated free so far escaped me until now.,


I believe it is safe to say the OOD’s navy career light went out with the collision.


This report is amateurish compared to a typical maritime incident case study.


Did you read the full 177 page one, or the short one they released that is way condensed?


It appears I’ve read the shortened one! Thanks


I think the full one was linked above somewhere, but honestly it doesn’t paint any better of a picture.

There’s point by point breakdowns and recommendations though, in the full one.


Here ya go…