KULLUK-On-The-Rocks

The article was written for urban readers of the New York Times Magazine, so I suppose we should not expect too many technical details or for the article to be written so that it would really make sense to informed mariners. While the article may be better than some others, it is a good illustration of how the press never gets the story straight.

If a hand held grapple was used at all, it must have been hauled in with the winch. If they tied a bowline in anything, it would have been in a soft line. I have to wonder, did Mathews just help throw the Orville Hook overboard which Alert then used to snag the parted tow gear and bring it aboard.

When I asked one of the Aiviq crew how they reconnected again, I was told that they used a helicopter to put men the Kulluk. I Don’t know if that is true. I doubt it. It would not surprise me if the Smit Salvage crew went aboard Kulluk to rig new tow gear, but I do not believe anyone else would have done that.

The article did not mention the other Chouest vessel, Naniq?, hooking on the Kulluk, and losing it again. Nor did it mention the first Crowley tug to take Kulluk in tow (wasn’t it the Guardian ?). Especially telling is that the article did not quote the captain of Alert (wasn’t that Rodney Lynch, by far the most experienced Alaska mariner on scene). I suspect that Mathews no longer works for Crowley, or if he does, that he will be getting his final paycheck quite soon.

The article did not discuss the ill-fated decision not to pass west of Sitkalidik Island and seek shelter near Old Harbor in between storms — a huge mistake — instead of first trying to tow offshore into the weather and then abandoning that effort after more parted tow lines and then trying to pass close along the lee shore of Sitkalidik Island in an unsuccessful attempt to round the east end before the full force of the next storm struck. If they had sought shelter at Old Harbor when they had the chance, Kulluk would not have ended up on the rocks.

This seems to me like a very important story that should be told in detail by a knowledgeable maritime writer, preferably in a book.

I believe the emergency tow line for the rig was dyneema, and that’s where the bowline was tied.

Shell has reportedly spent $6 billion on its Arctic adventure, but its probably a lot more than that. Maybe this short term and utterly irrelevant dip in oil prices provides a sufficient excuse for Shell managers to abandon what may have been a bad idea to begin with. Still its not easy to justify walking away from $6 to $8 billion.

I think that Shell would be better off to stay the course for another $2 billion and prove that there is in fact a lot of oil in the Arctic. When a company has close to $500 billion a year in revenue, a one time expense of $2 billion to save a $6 to $8 billion investment can be justified more easily than walking away.

If a huge oil find is discovered technology can be developed to exploit it. The Russians are producing Arctic oil from a much more remote location with much tougher ice conditions. Exxon’s new gravity base platform at Hebron on the Grand Banks is supposedly designed to withstand heavy pack ice and strikes by million ton icebergs (although that reminds me of the claims that the Titantic was unsinkable).

If billions of barrels of oil are actually found in only 300 feet of water in the Chukchi Sea, i am confident that the technology to exploit that resource on at least a six months per year seasonal basis can be developed. No icebergs in the Chukchi. Little to no multiyear ice. Probably less and less ice in years to come, and longer ice free seasons. A decade from now, an ordinary FPSO might be able to operate for five months per year.

Unless some new technology is developed, like cold fusion, that make oil obsolete, the price of oil will be high enough in another decade to make Arctic production cost effective. Even if it turns out to be an experiment that failed, we have to try.

Either way it would have been a job. The wire scenario just sounded cooler.

So alarms for the overflow tanks were ignored, or malfunctioned, one can assume.

My boat sounds an alarm with a minimal amount of fuel in the overflow tank nevermind a high level alarm scenario that would probably result in water reaching a fuel tank.

[QUOTE=z-drive;150784]So alarms for the overflow tanks were ignored, or malfunctioned, one can assume.

My boat sounds an alarm with a minimal amount of fuel in the overflow tank nevermind a high level alarm scenario that would probably result in water reaching a fuel tank.[/QUOTE]

I remember reading in the report that the alarms were ignored.

It’s not unusual to battle the OF alarms on a long tow with heavy weather and the tanks loaded to the max permissible. But water dumping out of the centrifuge might offer a clue that something’s off color. Ya think?

http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg545/docs/documents/Kulluk.pdf

Everyone should read.

Anybody else pickup this article stated that the aiviq put the alert in irons? WTF? If that had been me, I don’t think they would have needed a radio to hear me on the aiviq…

[QUOTE=tugsailor;150782]Unless some new technology is developed, like cold fusion, that make oil obsolete, the price of oil will be high enough in another decade to make Arctic production cost effective. Even if it turns out to be an experiment that failed, we have to try.[/QUOTE]

and you will find another greater proponent of arctic energy than I but I still say that at this particular moment in history, it is all folly. Production from the Alaskan Arctic will not happen in the first half of this century but will in the second when I am dead and gone. That is a pity because I was very hopeful to ride a wave to exit my career but I have come to accept the reality that Shell nor anyone else is in a position to get production going in the Chukchi or Beaufort Seas in at least two to three decades so long as adequate oil is found in more hospitable locales.

Cold duck: I couldn’t get that article to appear… apparently it is about 7K Terrabytes or something. RE: overflow on fuel tanks. … none of them should be filled over 90%, even with all the rocking going on by the time you got that xtra 10% filled with water the engines would be soaked. each tank has its’ own vent although rules allow running it into a common header (the vent lines). I still say something was fkt up in the eng. room, and this ship had never been in weather like that before? I just can’t see a eng. crew ‘freezing’ when the first eng. quit, hell, in extremis i’d run a line direct fm the purifier to the racors (throttled accordingly))… and what of the other day tank? both port and stbd took equal water?

Yea it’s 152 pages worth. Worth reading for sure.

[QUOTE=jimrr;150795]Cold duck: I couldn’t get that article to appear… apparently it is about 7K Terrabytes or something. RE: overflow on fuel tanks. … none of them should be filled over 90%, even with all the rocking going on by the time you got that xtra 10% filled with water the engines would be soaked. each tank has its’ own vent although rules allow running it into a common header (the vent lines). I still say something was fkt up in the eng. room, and this ship had never been in weather like that before? I just can’t see a eng. crew ‘freezing’ when the first eng. quit, hell, in extremis i’d run a line direct fm the purifier to the racors (throttled accordingly))… and what of the other day tank? both port and stbd took equal water?[/QUOTE]
Aerated fuel directly from the centrifuge wouldn’t play well in the engines. Also, the daytanks vent directly into the OF tank so with the low vent on deck, the OF tanks distribute the S/W to all tanks when full.

Also with the C280 Cats, when you loose 1 injector, the exhaust temps start climbing. Loose 2 and they skyrocket.

Too bad the New York Times reporter did not read the USCG report, and then get someone to explain it to him, before he wrote the article. Neither the article or the USCG report contains any amazing revelations.

At the end of the day, its what those us with winter Alaska towing experience, and who watched it unfold on marinetraffic, knew immediately: guys from the Gulf with no local knowledge, who did not know squat about towing in rough weather went out into well forecast heavy weather, took the wrong route, and the shit hit the fan leaving Kulluk on the rocks.

The Problem was not water in the fuel, it was lack of know how and bad decisionmaking.

they mention the “tow master” on the Kulluk working for shell, I assume this was a contracted individual but any insight into who that was and their background? Looks like they worked for “ORMI”

ORMI is an Association of Independent Marine Contractors formed to provide highly experienced rig movers and marine consultants to the worldwide offshore drilling rig industry.

Did any of those guys get naughty letters, probation, suspensions? Specifically one issue that comes to mind that would be important for the industry to see was not dividing into 3 watches.

[QUOTE=tugsailor;150803]Too bad the New York Times reporter did not read the USCG report, and then get someone to explain it to him, before he wrote the article. Neither the article or the USCG report contains any amazing revelations.

At the end of the day, its what those us with winter Alaska towing experience, and who watched it unfold on marinetraffic, knew immediately: guys from the Gulf with no local knowledge, who did not know squat about towing in rough weather went out into well forecast heavy weather, took the wrong route, and the shit hit the fan leaving Kulluk on the rocks.

The Problem was not water in the fuel, it was lack of know how and bad decisionmaking.[/QUOTE]

Having read the report it is apparent that lack of local knowledge, hubris as well as a mysterious fuel problem [probably due to water] contributed to this mess. Also mentioned was some very poor engineering design on the Aviq. The goobers that screwed the pooch from start to finish on this drilling adventure were also aided and abetted by some mighty lax oversight by ABS and the USCG themselves.
My prediction is little or nothing will change and only the lowest ranked players will suffer any consequences if there are any consequences.

If I am not mistaken the only Bayou boy from the Gulf onboard was a AB.

[QUOTE=coldduck;150779]I believe the emergency tow line for the rig was dyneema, and that’s where the bowline was tied.[/QUOTE]

That would make a little more sense.

[QUOTE=AHTS Master;150772]I can’t believe the engineer on the Alert caught the emergency tow bridle with a hand held grappling hook and then tied the wires together. That would be some really small wire.[/QUOTE]

As others have mentioned the emergency towing system was synthetic line but I do have experience knotting wire rope. I believe the cable in the photo below was around 1.5", the knot isn’t a bowline, and it was tied by a deckhand who had worked as a high lead logger. This knot allowed us to continue our tow from Neah Bay to Tacoma over the course of the following day.

I guess I’m used to dealing with 3 1/2 inch wire and tying knots is not something we do.

Don’t forget the two guys from the USCG who retired and went to work for SHELL immediately after ruling on things for SHELL while in the USCG which is highly illegal but was ignored by the investigation because it would have embarrassed the USCG. Neither of these esteemed gentlemen knew dick about offshore towing other than what they read in books and were part of the approval process for SHELL.

Does anyone see a conflict of interest or outright corruption or illegality here? :angry: