[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;85205]I do wish you would carefully read what I wrote. Stating that something influences an incident does not imply an intent to excuse.
[B]Except that you continuously suggest the other guy did it! Fact is that all the bullshit surrounding centralisers, long string versus liner etc…are diversions from the truth. The people controlling the well made the decision to continue, and they did this knowing sweet FA about what they were doing. This sums up the culture, put your hand in the fire when told to do so…without any understanding of the consequences.[/B]
My statement was that the shoreside management did not help and probably made life more complicated for the crew.
[B]The crew have escaped any criticism, and by crew I mean the guys sitting in the doghouse, the logger and the mud engineer. Any way you look at this, incompetence prevailed, and yet, no-one speaks of it. Whatever shoreside did or didn’t do is irrelevant. The crew had successfully run the casing and placed cement on bottom. Their only responsibility is to monitor the well, to interpret the data and signals from the well and above all take the required action to shut in when it became obvious that the well was flowing. When was it obvious? The very first time they opened the well and discovered excess flow. All they had to do was calculate the volume to bleed off and allow for a small amount of thermal expansion. Then monitor the displacement which the mud engineer did not participate in other than to write a plan for displacement which appears to have ignored any control of volume. That mud engineer visits Exxon rigs too!
So, what management had to do with any of these decisions is very questionable. The crews are expected to have the training to deal with the protection of all personnel on the vessel. If an idiot Co Man doesn’t know how to interpret the well’s pressure then the crew are supposed to react. They deal with pressure and signals from the well each and every day. To dismiss their responsibility and suggest onshore management ‘made life more complicated’ is clutching at untruths. This is a pressure job which has to be handled one stage at a time. [/B]
I’m not impressed by sweeping generalizations about GOM-wide practices. I find it hard to believe that an ExxonMobil rig crew would exhibit the behavior we saw on DWP. More to the point, I find it hard to believe that an ExxonMobile Drilling Engineer would get away with sending six revisions to a temporary abandonment plan in eight days without performing either a risk assessment or management of change step on any of them.
[B]You’ll just have to accept that the industry has its frustrating moments and they all have these experiences despite your unwillingness to believe.[/B]
The guy actually had to be reminded to include the negative pressure test.
[B]And the TO OIM’s statement in the morning suggested ‘we’ve always got the pinchers’! I assume he was prepared to continue with operations rather than contest any decisions. And, why the hell wasn’t he in the heart of the action? Because of the officials on the vessel? C’mon, he always insisted on negative tests. Couldn’t he just have relayed some of his experience where negative tests went wrong? His crew needed guidance and he was nowhere to be seen to hel with interpretation.[/B]
And do you actually think any other operator would send out a company man who not only had never been on a rig before but who accepted the “bladder effect” explanation so thoroughly that even after he was fished out of the water and got back to the office he sent out emails promoting it?
[B]I assume he was listening to the toolpusher who was just about to become the TO training Instructor for well control. Slightly ironic wouldn’t you say?[/B]
It is definitely the case that BP botched the takeover of Amoco and Arco. You think it’s a Brit/American thing; I think it was more a finance/operations thing (I have lived through a major takeover – they almost never work). BP’s numbers-driven managers forced out all the senior Amoco/Arco managers because they were too expensive. Here’s what Bob Bea, who was hired directly by Lord Browne to advise them on the takeover, said about that decision:
[B]Obama, made it a Brit/American thing and the whole country listened to the media spouting untruths about BP. The lynch mob mentality started in the White House and they needed a culprit quickly to appease a nation who had just lost 11 of their sons due to the ineptitude of BP in London, apparently! So, they decided on Hayward as an easy target. The attack on his character can only be likened to the mentality of the muslims in Egypt leaving the Mosque to fight the infidel after being ‘instructed’ and ‘directed’ by the holier than thou Mullahs![/B]
“You’re screwed. You just early-retired your memory. You early-retired the people who remember all those mistakes you’ve ever made, and you’ve left all the bright young people without adequate mentors.” Bea further said that BP was too enthusiastic with its downsizing and left it with a “brittle organization” “When you put them under stress they tend to collapse.” The beancounters “stripped away all the robustness. BP became defect intolerant. The problem is, life is full of defects.”
[B]Mistakes are made in every organisation! Is any of this relevant to the inept actions on the vessel? [/B]
BP Houston/ex-Amoco/ex-Arco was a mess. Here’s the content of an April 17 email between the Wells Team Leader (who had just received a de facto demotion) and the Drilling Operations Manager:
"[DOM], over the past four days there have been so many last minute changes to the operation that the WSL’s have finally come to their wits end. The quote is ‘flying by the seat of our pants.’ More over, we have made a special boat or helicopter run everyday. Everybody wants to do the right thing, but this huge level of paranoia from engineering leadership is driving chaos. This operation is not Thunderhorse. [The Drilling Engineer] has called me numerous times trying to make sense of all the insanity. Last night’s emergency revolved around the 30 bbls of cement spacer behind the top plug and how it would affect any bond logging (I do not agree with putting the spacer above the plug to begin with). This morning [the Drilling Engineer] called me and asked my advice about exploring opportunities both inside and outside of the company.
[B]I take it that he was looking for a job elsewhere! And remember, the casing was put in place successfully. The only thing that went wrong was the action of the personnel on the vessel. There are so many cement jobs that fail but they must be recognised especially during an inflow test. Where was the goddam OIM who insisted on taking the inflow test and where was his instruction to maintain volume control? [/B]
What is my authority? With the separation of engineering and operations I do not know what I can and can’t do. The operation is not going to succeed if we continue in this manner."
[B]Isn’t that a question a driller and Toolpusher should also make? Am I going to continue blind and not tell anyone I don’t understand what’s going on. [/B]
Finally, I think it is good for your industry and society as a whole that there are people inside API, IADC, COS and the operating companies who have refused to accept the proposition that once you have placed the onus on the crew there is nothing more to learn.
[B]But, it might help if people could understand that the personnel on the vessel obviously had no idea what they were dealing with…and didn’t seek clarification or shout STOP. Remember, this was over 1000 barrels before anyone attempted to shut in. I believe this is the largest ever undetected influx! API, IADC, COs all have a part to play in ensuring Drillers and Toolpushers know a little more than closing the pinchers! If they want to set standards then they need to make sure they aren’t ‘voluntary’.[/B]
[B]It’s fine to continuously blame folk further up the line but we also have to be fair and recognise that each and every one of us is responsible for our action and inaction. [/B]