Avoiding Navy Collisions: What Can Be Done?

I’ve asked before but did not get a reply;
These destroyers have CPP, yet it appears that they use RPMs rather than Pitch to adjust speed. WHY??

Errors are made in wheelhouse all the time, to avoid an incident the bridge team has to trap the errors.

The ship’s head was not the same as ordered course
Actual rpm was not the same as ordered.
Ship was departing from planned track
Relative movement of near by ship was not as expected.

These are the things the watch is in the wheelhouse to monitor. The CO, XO, OOD, JOOD, Conning officer, Navigator are all in the wheel house and evidently none of them were aware of what was happening?

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I agree completely.

My comment re setting S&A Detail was based on the fact that the entire bridge team changes when the detail is set, with more experienced personnel on each bridge station (as well as in engineering and aft steering). The cascading events started with the Helmsman having trouble controlling both helm and throttles, and this probably would not have occurred if S&A had been set before entering the TSS, as planned and briefed the previous day.

And my comment above is not meant to detract from the current conversations re the overall inadequate watchstander training in the current surface Navy.

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I think that’s just a terminology mixup

Above a certain speed you’re already at 100% pitch and can only increase speed further by increasing RPM.

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Definitely. My experience goes back to Spruance class. If a GT was engaged to the reduction gear, the minimum shaft speed was 55RPM. Ship speed was pitch controlled from 0%-100% pitch, then by RPM increase. On a Spruance, the 55RPM/100% pitch combination was right at 13kts. We unrep’d at 13kts, instead of the usual 12kts.

But we are talking about superior fools.

You know the old saying about making things idiot proof? They just keep making better idiots.

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I haven’t been on gCap since the last time I posted when salty civilian mariners posted snide comments to my posts.

Anyway, like I said months ago, the solution to prevent collisions is to start at the beginning, stricter admission requirements for the Academy, toughen up standards to join Navy enlisted. We need better caliber minds in both the officer and enlisted ranks.

And make it damn easy to get bounced out of the Academy, OCS, and boot camp. You show a critical flaw in your first six months service, bam, you’re out.

Then, just as I experienced in combat in Vietnam, every day officers and enlisted train, drill, train, and drill some more. If officers can’t cut it on a ship, they get put into a billet that’s a good fit, or they get discharged. Same goes for enlisted.

Bottom line: The Fitzgerald and McCain accidents exemplified the problem with the US Navy, the officers and enlisted are lazy, incompetent, undisciplined, unprofessional, and many are morally bankrupt who have no business being in the Navy or any military branch.

Oh, here’s a nice summary on the results of the Navy’s investigation. Warning: A very distressing read.

P.S. A link therein to the full report, which I am sure you have all read.

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For a minute there I thought you were talking about congress or the White House.

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Again, Too many people are present. The CO thinks the XO is watching things, he Xo thinks the OOD has an eye on things, The OOD thinks the CO has assumed the conn. The JOOD is waiting for someone to tell him what to do… etc…

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That is exactly what caused at least one of these incidents.

So in essence, a complete breakdown of bridge resource management

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There has been a lot of talk about the user interface and the confusion it caused. What defence contractor came up with such poor but no doubt expensive design, approved by some desk bound warrior looking for his next job. It would not meet IACS standards by any means.

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Sure, the problem with ineffective redundancy could be the assumption that someone else is paying attention. What was CIC doing for example?

But the bridge isn’t just a random group of people. The argument could be made that one person can run with a football so a NFL football team would be more effective with a single person. Otherwise who will hike the ball, catch it? Who’s going to block and so forth. How does a pro football team overcome this problem?

If the JSM conning officer was training when things hit the fan the bridge team has to reorganize. In my experience the first thing that happens is the CO has the conning officer relieved. For example CO tells the XO to take the conn. CO tells OOD to get the situation with the steering straightened out.

Not saying the officers were inexperienced and incompetent but if they were then it doesn’t matter if there’s two or ten.

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So after a person with first hand experience explains the function to you and describes how simple it is, you go on with this bullshit? The system sounds to me like it’s nearly foolproof and the users didn’t know how to use it.

Of course the Navy is going to hype up the UI being bad, that takes the spotlight off their incompetent people and lack of training.

What specifically makes you think it wouldn’t meet IACS standards?

We better not drag politics into the discussion, especially this year. That will bring the dirt clods out. P.S. I thought I was too.

IACS clearly separate Hem and Manouvering stations

http://www.iacs.org.uk/download/5879

I saw nothing to that effect in there, but it was a quick search. Please provide the exact wording and page number.

Are you saying there’s supposed to be two people? That they can’t have both switch with one command? Please specify what exactly you’re trying to say.

It’s clearly a systemic lack of knowledge at the root, especially in the SWO community in regard to seamanship, and not much more. Bureaucracy and mounds of instructions upon instructions don’t help as well.

I have seen some good steps in the right direction recently I’ll talk about later however.

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Kennebe_ Captain,

CIC is sending yet more information into the situation. Shipping contact information that the OOD and JOOD can gleam just by looking out the window with a quick flick of the eyes to the ARPA radar to confirm what they are looking at.
Entering those straits, as I have numerous times, you have 50 radar contacts at times, of which only 5 or 6 really need your attention at one time. You do not need a yet another droning voice verbally telling you what you just saw.

They are also passing navigation, yet another voice, confirming what the Quartermaster, your eyes and your JOOD just told you.

My fear is the USN’s solution here will be to add still more persons to the mix.